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Abstract  
The aim of the article is to explore the managerial practices that enable capitalizing on the 
critical instability during an on-going transition period in the life-cycle of an industry.  The 
investigation followed a qualitative approach using a field-based case study method and a 
longitudinal design. Multiple data collection methods were adopted to reduce a systematic bias 
in the gathered data and to develop the case, shaped by the context and emergent data. The 
gathered rich data enabled the confrontation of industry transformation signals with the strategic 
maneuvering exhibited by the investigated firm. Observed options involved imitating, 
repositioning, exiting or entering. The study is a part of a larger project financed by National 
Science Centre of Poland (NCN) - 2013/11/D/HS4/03965 
 
Keywords: industry life-cycle, industrial transition, photovoltaics, strategic positioning, value capture, 
value appropriation.  
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Formułowanie strategicznej odpowiedzi na wyzwania etapu przejściowego w cyklu życia branży 
– przypadek branży fotowoltaicznej 
 
Abstrakt 
Celem artykułu jest zbadanie praktyk menedżerskich, które umożliwiają tworzenie i zatrzymywanie 
wartości w okresie przejściowym w cyklu życia branży. Badania miały charakter podłużny, 
przeprowadzono je zgodnie z podejściem jakościowym za pomocą metody studium przypadku. 
Zastosowano zróżnicowane spektrum metod gromadzenia danych, aby zminimalizować ryzyko błędów 
systematycznych i jednocześnie opracować przypadek, kształtowany przez kontekst i pojawiające się w 
trakcie realizacji procesu badawczego dane. Zgromadzony materiał empiryczny umożliwił konfrontację 
sygnałów zmian w dynamice rozwoju branży z wyborami strategicznymi dokonywanymi przez badana 
firmę. Obserwowane opcje działań polegały na naśladowaniu, repozycjonowaniu, wychodzeniu lub 
wchodzeniu do pokrewnych branż. Badanie jest częścią większego projektu finansowanego przez 
Narodowe Centrum Nauki (NCN) - 2013/11 / D / HS4 / 03965. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: cykl życia branży, rozwój branży, fotowoltaika, strategiczne pozycjonowanie, 
przechwytywanie wartości, zawłaszczanie wartości. 
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Introduction 
Extant research shares the argument that a transition period in the industry life-cycle 
represents a critical time for incumbents as well as new entrants (e.g. Agarwal, Sarkar, & 
Echambadi, 2002). It brings about major changes in the competitive dynamics (Agarwal et al., 
2002; Cusumano, Kahl, & Suarez, 2015) and, thus. generates attractive but temporal windows 
of opportunity. Hence, managers have a quite limited timeframe for reconfiguring deployed 
patterns of action in order to capitalize on those opportunities. One of the main challenges 
relates to the proper identification of possibly early signals of the shift in the competitive 
landscape of an industry. Extant literature has presented an appealing set of indicators informing 
about an industrial transition (Najda-Janoszka, 2017). However, provided evidence and 
analyses have been based on retrospective data on industries that already reached the stage of 
maturity. Thus, the informative potential of discussed indicators may be limited when used to 
assess the harbingers of an on-going industrial transformation. Given the paucity of studies 
reaching beyond the retrospection, this study is focused on an on-going transition process in the 
life-cycle of the photovoltaic (PV) industry. The aim of the article is to explore the managerial 
practices that enable capitalizing on the critical instability during a transition period. Given the 
explorative character of the study, the investigation followed a qualitative approach using a 
field-based case study method and a longitudinal design. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a theoretical 
background on the industry development trajectory, industrial transition assessment and 
strategic manoeuvring during transition. The section on methodology introduces the research 
design, criteria used for case selection and the data collection procedure. Findings are presented 
in the Results section, which is followed by Conclusions outlining implications for management 
research.  
 
Theoretical Background 
The nature of industries evolves over time and the observed cumulative change extends 
beyond the mere statistics of firm entry and exit (e.g. Klepper, 1996; Audretsch, Houweling, & 
Thurik, 2004; Cusumano et al., 2015). The continuous interplay between environmental 
changes and firms’ strategic choices brings about major qualitative transformations in the 
industry’s competitive landscape (Agarwal et al., 2002; Cusumano et al., 2015). Regularities 
and disruptions in the trajectory of industrial development have been commonly explored with 
the reference to the concept of industry life-cycle (e.g. Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Klepper, 
1996; Miles, Snow, & Sharfman, 1993; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Agarwal et al., 2002). 
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Much attention has been directed toward mechanisms that produce a life-cycle pattern of an 
industry (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2002; Klepper, 1996). Accordingly, there are three main research 
streams that provide alternating explanations for the driving force of industry evolution through 
stages of emergence, growth, maturity and decline. According to the evolutionary economics, 
the key mechanism is represented by a knowledge regime, which drives the cost-spreading 
effect and determines the minimum efficient scale barriers (Klepper, 1996; Malerba, 2006). In 
turn, the technology management perspective points to technological developments 
(discontinuities) that create competition for dominance between multiple alternative 
product/technology designs (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Christensen, Suarez, & Utterback, 1998). The last research stream of the organizational ecology 
focuses on the density of population (industry) that enhances its institutional legitimacy and 
facilitates competition over the same set of finite resources (Hannan & Carrol, 1992; Wade, 
1995; Baum & Oliver, 1991). Although provided explanations appear quite distinct, the insights 
are not mutually exclusive, rather complementary. The explanatory strength and 
complementary linkages are affected by the diverse nature of industries (Agarwal et al., 2002; 
Petloniemi, 2011). Further, regardless of the theoretical roots, extant research shares an 
important argument that the transition from growth to the maturity stage represents a critical 
time in the industry life span (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2002; Cusumano et al., 2015). It is a period 
when the variation is being taken over by the selection process (Petloniemi, 2011). An industrial 
transition is highly demanding with regard to strategic maneuvering, as managers have a quite 
limited timeframe for reconsideration and reconfiguration of firms’ strategic behavior (Agarwal 
et al., 2002). Deciphering the harbingers of an upcoming transformation is a difficult challenge 
due to important limitations in the assessment techniques and abilities. Firstly, depending on a 
particular research stream, authors have tended to focus selectively on either the properties of 
the knowledge base, technology advances or population density and structure (Najda-Janoszka, 
2017). Secondly, numerous studies have stressed the conditional validity of proposed indicators 
(Najda-Janoszka, 2017; Petloniemi, 2011). Finally, the provided causal explanations of 
transformation have been based on retrospective data on industries that already reached the 
stage of maturity. There is an evident lack of research focused on the evaluation of an on-going 
industrial transition, when competitive ramifications for introduced innovations, developments 
in technology, market conditions or institutional arrangements have yet to be determined. 
Moving beyond historical analyses toward an uncertain, ambiguous, partially visible 
competitive landscape implies building more on the complementarities between the extant 
research streams; hence, considering and evaluating not selected, individual indicators, but a 
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broader set of possible early signals (Najda-Janoszka, 2017). A broad scanning can enhance the 
identification of various localized changes that may in a short run develop into tendencies 
spanning across the industry (Teece, 2007; Najda-Janoszka, 2016a, b). Given the accelerating 
pace of changes shaping the evolutionary pattern of industries, the timeframe for sensing and 
responding to shifting circumstances shortens substantially (Agarwal et al., 2002; D’Aveni, 
1994; Najda-Janoszka, 2016b, c), and competitive rearrangements generate both strategic 
opportunities and threats for incumbents as well as new entrants. Depending on the type of 
sensed signals and the comparative costs of adjustments, firms can choose different strategic 
options aiming at capitalizing on the transitional instability (Argyres, Bigelow, & Nickerson, 
2015). Strategic maneuvering by incumbents may involve not only imitating or exiting, but also 
repositioning into niches, while de novo entrants may consider entering by innovating or 
imitating successful solutions (Argyres et. al., 2015). Interestingly, each of those strategic 
options has been discussed as an individual yet comprehensive response to the transition signals 
(Argyres et al., 2015). There has been an evident lack of research providing insights into the 
usage of those options in a combination. Hence, this study challenges the perspective by treating 
strategic options as potentially transitory not ultimate solutions. 
 
Methodology 
Given the explorative character of the study, the investigation followed a qualitative approach 
using a field-based case study method, which facilitates a holistic understanding of context-
bound and complex phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). The implemented procedure 
complies with the instrumental case study design framework (Stake, 1995). The case selection 
procedure involved three main stages. The first one included the identification of a dynamically 
growing industry exhibiting potential for transition. It was followed by the selection of 
candidate firms with a minimum of 5 years’ performance history and operating in that industry. 
The final stage was focused on selecting a suitable firm providing a satisfactory level of richness 
and diversity of data, as well as ready access to key informants in a longer time span. In order 
to examine changes in competitive conditions of the chosen industry and a pattern of strategic 
choices made by the selected firm, the study followed a longitudinal approach. Multiple data 
collection methods were adopted to reduce a systematic bias in the gathered data and to develop 
the case, shaped by the context and emergent data (Stake, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989). The case 
relies on current and retrospective data collected through:  
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- four waves of semi-structured, two- to three-hour in-person interviews carried out in 2012, 
2013, 2015, 2017 with highly knowledgeable managers of the selected firm (top and project 
managers), 
- three direct observations conducted in the years 2013–2016,  
- extraction from internal firm documentation (a total of 18 documents, which included 
financial statements, project documentation, audit reports), 
- extraction from external secondary sources (press releases, industry statistics and reports 
of the International Renewable Energy Agency – IRENA, International Energy Agency – 
IEA, Joint Research Centre (JCR) of the European Commission, World Intellectual 
Property Organization –WIPO). 
All relevant information was retrieved according to a developed data collection protocol and 
was recorded into the case study database (Yin, 2014). Because of high sensitivity of collected 
data, the names of the investigated firm and related corporations were disguised.  
The study represents a part of a larger project “Dynamics and determinants of the process of 
appropriating value from projects implemented in the inter-organizational networks” financed 
by the National Science Centre of Poland (NCN) on the basis of the decision number 
2013/11/D/HS4/03965. 
  
Results  
Challenged by the spatial constraints and the trade-off between better stories and better theories 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 29), the extensive narrative way of presentation was 
compromised and broken down to a more theory-oriented description. Hence, obtained results 
were divided into four parts: concise characteristics of the chosen industry, a brief description 
of the selected firm, the identification of the features of industrial transition, the evaluation of 
the firm’s strategic response to sensed signals.  
Photovoltaics industry 
Solar photovoltaic (PV) technologies enable the conversion of a uniquely abundant resource 
– the sun’s radiation – into electricity. A solar cell, the basic element of the PV system, becomes 
a source of direct current (DC) when exposed to sunlight. Yet, generating usable alternating 
current (AC) involves grouping cells into modules, panels, arrays, and finally into whole 
systems. Those systems equipped with electric system components allow for the conversion of 
the output of PV solar panels into utility frequency AC and for the connection to the grid. The 
value chain of the PV industry depicted in Figure 1 clearly reflects the logic. It begins with the 
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raw material (silicon, compounds), proceeds through basic cell and module production, and 
continues all the way to installation, operation and maintenance (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. PV industry value chain. Source: Authors’ own work. 
 
 
The upstream part of the value chain, involving raw material production, is commonly 
recognized as technology- and capital-intensive (International Renewable Energy Agency 
[IRENA], 2016; Jäger-Waldau, 2017). On the contrary, the midstream business is more labor-
intensive; hence, entry barriers are related predominantly to the economies of scale (IRENA, 
2016; Jäger-Waldau, 2017). The downstream industry is again a technology-intensive one 
(IRENA, 2016; Jäger-Waldau, 2017). Business activity of the investigated firm Solaris Ltd. 
involves the production of main components of inverters, i.e. electrical converters of the 
current; hence, the company’s operations are linked with the downstream part of the industry 
value chain.  
Although the first conventional PV cells were produced already in the late 1950s, and in the 
1980s PV became a common power source for consumer electronic devices, for many years 
solar PV power systems were considered an expensive luxury (IRENA, 2016). The introduction 
of large subsidy programs at the turn of the millennium provided the critical trigger for the 
dynamic growth of PV systems and the whole industry. Over time, the economic potential of 
solar PV power has become a major issue when discussing its development trajectories (Zou et 
al., 2017). With a stronger emphasis on the economic efficiency of PV power systems, 
a growing number of countries have recently begun to shift from heavy subsidization toward 
retroactive measures (International Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme 
[IEA PVPS], 2018). Given the high dependency of the PV industry on complex support policy 
Silicon purification 
Ingot production 
Wafer production 
Cell production 
Module production 
PV system installation 
PV system maintenance 
upstream midstream downstream 
Inverters  
PV system integration 
Mechanical & electrical 
system components  
Compounds  
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mechanisms, the observed regulatory changes occurring across global markets may 
substantially affect the hitherto forecasted PV deployment trajectories (Ito, 2015). 
Currently, the solar PV industry has become one of the fastest growing industries with the 
compound annual growth rate of 40% (since 2001) (IEA PVPS, 2018). Increasing prices of 
electricity from conventional energy sources, a continuous decrease of PV system prices and 
heavy subsidization of PV investments have been stimulating the development of solar energy 
markets – in 2016, investments reached EUR 103.4 billion, i.e. 55% of all new renewable 
energy investments (Jäger-Waldau, 2017). The global inverter market was estimated at around 
USD 6 billion in 2017 (GTM Research). Growths have been reported in the world PV market 
for both utility-scale and rooftop solar PV systems (IRENA, 2016). The observed trends have 
highlighted a dramatic increase of mini PV installations owned by individuals (IRENA, 2016; 
Information Handling Services [IHS], 2015). In terms of geography, the number of significant 
PV markets has been growing steadily – by the end of 2017, there were 29 countries with at 
least 1 GW of cumulative PV capacity. Nevertheless, with the global total installed capacity of 
402.5 GW at the end of 2017, the world market was dominated by China (131 GW), USA (51 
GW), Japan (49 GW) and Germany (42 GW), and at the same time 90% of the global PV market 
was represented by only 10 countries (IEA PVPS, 2018). The growing significance of the 
industry in the global economy can be also seen in the labor market, as the employment level 
has reached almost 3 million people across the PV value chain (IRENA, 2016).  
 
Solaris Ltd. 
Solaris was founded in 1991. It entered the semiconductor industry as a producer of 
transformers and induction components for electrical applications in the automotive and railway 
industries. Despite a small size and limited resources, Solaris exhibited a strong orientation 
towards quality and innovativeness right from the early days of operating (winner of prestigious 
national awards for innovative firms). It invested heavily in the development of its own R&D 
department – shortly, major patented innovations were put into mass production. “It was 
extremely challenging for a small firm as ours to secure its highly innovative solutions against 
highly interested competitors. We had to put a lot of effort to develop our know-how protection 
system“. By maintaining the sensitive knowledge base proprietary (Najda-Janoszka, 2016a), 
Solaris was able to build a strong position on the market served. At the turn of the millennium, 
the company became a developer and supplier of components for the PV industry. Soon, the 
quality and innovativeness of provided solutions paved the way for the firm’s future in the 
promising PV industry. In just 4 years of operating on the PV market, the firm’s turnover 
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increased by 1000% and net profits by 1500%. By the end of the decade, Solaris was 
categorized as a large company and became the major supplier for the global inverter producer 
Sun Corp. (cf. supplier upgrading in Gancarczyk & Gancarczyk, 2016). By cooperating closely 
with Sun Corp., ”the firm has benefited not only through increased sales volumes, but also got 
access to new advanced management practices allowing for substantial cost reduction“. In 
2011, Solaris was sold to the cooperating partner Sun Corp. As a subsidiary, it maintained 
a high level of decisional autonomy. With a sudden PV market collapse in 2012, Solaris 
experienced a drop in sales (approx. 35%) for the first time in its history. However, in a short 
time, it adjusted to market changes through cost reduction as well as customer and product 
diversification. At the beginning of 2014, the downward trend was stopped, and in subsequent 
years sales stabilized at a lower but satisfactory level – ”even in tough times, the firm maintained 
20% return on sales“. 
 
Industry transition features and strategic response 
The analysis covers the period of 2000–2017, which reflects the most intensive 
development of the industry. With the introduction of large subsidy programs, the whole 
industry began to develop at a much faster pace than forecasted. Nevertheless, given the 
technological and financial limitations as well as changes in the support policy regulations, the 
development trajectory observed and experienced by incumbents and de novo entrants was far 
from a straight line. Results presented in the table below (Table 1) reflect that complex picture. 
For each indicator of industry transition, there were clearly confirming signals, but also quite 
ambiguous ones suggesting alternative scenarios. 
 
 
Transformation indicators  Confirming signals Non-confirming / ambiguous signals 
 
Increasing share of process 
innovations at the expense of 
product innovations (Cohen & 
Klepper, 1996) 
 
A steep learning curve, with an increase 
of process innovations enabling cost 
reduction (80% price decrease in the 
period 2008–2015). A considerable 
number of process innovations 
protected by secrecy, not patents. In the 
period 2008–2011, most process 
innovations generated in the midstream 
(cell and module production). From 
2011, an increase observed in process 
innovations enabling the reduction of 
inverter cost (cost pressure shifted from 
modules toward Balance of System 
[BoS] – inverters, mounting systems, 
batteries). At the end of the first decade 
of the new millennium, firms began to 
 
From 2011, patent data suggested a shift 
in research from the conventional 
crystalline silicon technology toward 
the next generation of technologies, e.g. 
thin film, organic PV. From 2011, a 
significant increase observed in product 
innovation measured in terms of 
improved conversion efficiencies (world 
records broken almost every year after 
2010, before – a rather slow progress). 
According to data, the price dive 
observed in 2008–2015 was caused not 
only by continuous technological 
improvements but also by over-
production and over-capacity stimulated 
by policy support measures. 
 10 
 
focus more on branding-related 
activities – an exponential growth of the 
use of trademark protection for PV 
products and services. 
 
 
Technological convergence 
facilitating the emergence of a 
dominant design 
(Abernathy & Utterback, 
1978; Anderson & Tushman, 
1990) 
Dominant types of PV cells include 
crystalline (mono and poly) PV cells, 
which account for close to 90% of the 
world’s market. Designs based on 
wafers of silicon dominated from the 
early 90’s. The inverter market, initially 
dominated by central inverters, became 
divided between central and a more 
flexible string technology. The string 
inverters gradually increased their 
global market share. Microinverters 
remained a niche solution, considered as 
a premium product (notably higher 
cost). 
During the height of the polysilicon 
bottleneck (2004–2009), the alternative 
thin film technology increased the 
market share up to 18% (2009), 
challenging the silicon technology. With 
cheaper silicon – crystalline silicon took 
over the market again from 2010.  
Coexistence of parallel solutions 
(silicon, thin film, organic, 
multijunction) commercially available 
on a global scale.  
In 2017, the observed growth of central 
inverters comprised in a modular way, 
thus enabling design flexibility, the key 
advantage of string inverters. 
Introduction by a single firm 
of a new product that benefits 
from a large, unanticipated 
surge in demand – innovation 
shock (Argyres, Bigelow, & 
Nickerson (2015) 
Introduction of a commercially 
successful microinverter in 2008 by 
Enphase. The invention received a wide 
recognition as a disruptive value 
proposition. Forecasts from 2010 
estimated a steep price drop – steeper 
than for central inverters. Fast reaction 
by large incumbents – observed 
investments in microinverter 
technology.  
In 2016, microinverters considered still 
promising, yet a premium product of a 
higher price. Market share remained 
low (niche product for the residential 
market), while string and central 
inverters maintained dominance.  
Shakeout while industry input 
is still growing (Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978; Jovanovic & 
MacDonald, 1994) 
Major wave of bankruptcies and 
shutdowns observed after the silicon 
crisis (overcapacity build-up, 
incumbents locked in high-priced 
contracts while new entrants could 
benefit from low-cost silicon feedstock) 
and subsidy curtailment – period of 
2010–2013. Some diversified firms 
decided to leave the industry. A wave of 
exits included many small but also large 
corporations.  
Although numerous firms went 
bankrupt or left the industry, many 
small companies survived, preserving 
the fragmentary structure of the large 
part of the industry.  
Increasing concentration of 
resources in fewer large 
organizations (Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975; Helfat, 
2015) 
Up to 2004, a relatively high 
concentration observed across the 
industry value chain – top five firms, 
mostly from Europe, accounted for 60–
100% of the market. After a massive 
entry period (2004–2010), the industry 
experienced bankruptcies and 
acquisitions, widespread overcapacity, 
retroactive measures in supporting 
policies, rise of antidumping actions, 
which heightened expectations for the 
upcoming consolidation. Introduced 
antidumping tariffs (from 2012) 
triggered geographical expansion and 
diversification of incumbents. 
Starting from 2004/2005, high 
concentration decreased notably till 
2012 as many new firms entered the 
dynamically growing industry, with a 
substantial support provided by 
favorable regulations. 
A decrease observed in IP concentration 
(up to 2011), indicating fragmentation 
of the industry. 
From 2014, a significant number of new 
entries as well as re-entries of large 
semiconductor, construction or energy-
related companies. 
Up to 2017, midstream and downstream 
businesses remained highly fragmented.  
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Accordingly, the inverter market 
developed from quite consolidated (up 
to 2010, top five firms accounted for 65 
% of the market) to fragmented (2012–
2014, top five firms accounted for less 
than 50% of the market) and back again 
to more consolidated (2016–2017, top 
five firms accounted for 60% of the 
market).  
 
 
Increasing disintegration 
along the value chain (Stigler, 
1951) 
Many successful pure players operating 
across the industry. Numerous highly 
diversified corporations present at 
different parts of the industry value 
chain. Specialization tendencies 
observed in the downstream business – 
installers, integrators, maintenance 
services providers.  
Up to 2008, the whole value chain was 
dominated by module suppliers. First 
signals of vertical integration directed 
downstream observed during the 
financial crisis of 2008 (limited 
financial support for PV projects). Solar 
PV manufacturers invested in project 
development to generate demand for 
their own upstream products. Following 
the price dive in 2011 and a severe drop 
in profit margins, many upstream and 
midstream firms turned to the 
downstream business in search of profit 
margins – some global players 
integrated along the whole value chain.  
Affected by the price pressure from 
2011, inverter producers invested in 
complex solutions for PV system 
management and recently (2015) in 
digital platforms (opportunities to 
expand the market – entry into parallel 
industries e.g. e-mobility, energy 
storage, heating and cooling).  
Tab. 1. Industry transition features 2000-2017. Source: Authors’ own work. 
 
 
 
Strategic response to transition signals 
At the next stage of the analysis, the industry dynamics was confronted with the activity 
pattern of Solaris Ltd. Accordingly, all major strategic decisions of Solaris became 
accompanied by a corresponding context throughout the period of 17 years. The figure below 
illustrates the results on a single time line (Figure 2). 
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Fig. 2. Strategic response. Source: Authors’ own work. 
 
 
Strategic maneuvering exhibited by Solaris has involved a combination of all options 
discussed in the literature, i.e. entry, repositioning, imitation, exit. The firm entered the 
semiconductor industry with highly innovative solutions offered for the automotive and railway 
businesses. Being aware of strong competition in those industries, in 2001 Solaris seized the 
opportunity to reposition toward a niche represented by the promising PV industry. By the year 
2008 (end of the silicon crisis), the niche became the only business of Solaris – it exited the 
automotive and railway industries. However, with the rising attractiveness of the PV industry, 
also the number of new entrants and the intensity of competition grew. Challenged by the new 
context and the time pressure, Solaris decided to use the imitation strategy. The microinverter 
technology introduced by Enphase in 2008 was then considered as a disruptive value 
proposition with the potential to completely rearrange the inverter market. Observing the 
market reaction and competitors’ investments, Solaris decided to imitate the new solution by 
acquiring in 2009 a small company with the necessary know-how. Despite the fact that 
microinverters turned out to remain a niche, premium product, Solaris capitalized on the 
acquired know-how by advancing capabilities in miniaturization. At the end of the first decade 
of the millennium, there were already some weak signals of possible changes in support policy 
1991  
Entry into the 
semiconductor 
industry 
2000  
Support policy based 
on the Feed-in-Tariff 
scheme 
Silicon shortage crisis 
 
Rising prices 
2001  
First contract 
for the PV 
industry 
Heavy investment in the new niche 
2008 
Exit from the 
automotive and 
railway industries 
2009 
Acquisition of 
microinverter 
producer 
Massive entry of new 
inverter manufacturers 
2008 
 Microinverter 
launched by Enphase 
Drop of cell & module prices 
Bankruptcies & exits 
2011 
Solaris sold to 
Sun Corp. 
2012  
Retroactive measures in 
support policies, 
antidumping tariffs 
Drop in sales 
2014 
Focus on cost 
reduction and 
miniaturization 
Price pressure on inverter producers 
Cooperation 
with East-Asian 
suppliers 
2015 
Investment in 
digital systemic 
solutions 
2016 
Geographical 
expansion in 
Asia 
Industry dynamics 
Solaris activity 
 13 
 
regulations, which could affect the PV industry dramatically. Hence, owners of Solaris decided 
to sell (exit) the company to the cooperating partner in 2011, right before the major shakeout in 
the industry followed by a drop in sales experienced by Solaris for the first time in its history.  
Affected by the pressure on inverter producers to cut prices, Solaris followed the trend and 
focused more on process innovations allowing for cost reduction. Shortly, the company decided 
to go further and entered Asian markets with joint-ventures and co-production (entry), as one 
of the first western PV inverter-related firms to do so. Recognizing that after the dive of module 
prices the attention shifted toward the Balance of System (BOS), and that high profit margins 
could still be made in the downstream business, Solaris turned again to repositioning by 
investing in digital system solutions. Although currently a niche activity, the management board 
has considered the digital direction as the first footstep into new parallel industries.  
 
Conclusions  
The foregoing analysis has shown that deciphering the on-going transformational processes 
along the evolutionary trajectory of an industry is a very challenging task (Najda-Janoszka, 
2017). Gathered evidence has suggested that an industry transition may not necessarily follow 
a typical pattern (Helfat, 2015). During the critical period of 2000–2017, incumbents and de 
novo entrants experienced and evaluated a multitude of contradictory signals. Relatively clearly 
visible trends, compliant with indicators discussed in the literature, were disrupted by events, 
business activities and regulatory changes that in turn suggested alternative scenarios, e.g. the 
assumed innovation shock of microinverters, thin film development during the silicon crisis, 
retroactive measures introduced in Spain or Germany. In other cases, indicators appeared in 
a modified way, e.g. persistent coexistence of multiple dominant designs (cells, inverters) as 
well as vertically integrated and disintegrated corporations. Thus, the obtained results have 
confirmed the arguments that, depending on the specificity of a given industry, particular 
indicators may vary in their relevance and in the amount of information they can provide at a 
given point in time (e.g. Filson, 2001; de Vries, de Ruiter & Argam, 2011; Breschi, Malerba, 
& Orsenigo, 2000; Helfat, 2015). The peculiarity of the PV industry relates not only to its 
technological profile but even more strongly to its subsidy-induced boom-and-bust cycles (IEA 
PVPS, 2018; Jäger-Waldau, 2017). It has been commonly agreed that the dynamic growth of 
the PV energy use, faster than provided for in official forecasts, was driven mainly by public 
incentives (Zou et al., 2017). Hence, the observed retroactive measures in support policies, 
a tendency that has gradually spilled over the globe, can be considered as an additional indicator 
of the PV industry transition – from an artificially oversized to competitive and profitable 
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without subsidization. The example of the PV industry has stressed the importance of a broad 
perspective for assessing the changes occurring in the competitive conditions of an industry in 
order to take advantage of them in a timely and effective manner (Najda-Janoszka, 2017, 
2016b). The investigated firm Solaris Ltd. implemented such approach and managed to 
formulate appropriate responses at the right time. The longitudinal design of the research has 
provided a broader picture of the strategic maneuvering practiced by Solaris during the PV 
industry transition period. The analyzed transition has been depicted as a process that evolves 
over years; hence, as a process that opens the door to multiple strategic options and not just one 
optimal solution. The exhibited high sensitivity to various signals, a result of the continuous 
scanning activity, provided necessary time for undertaking key strategic decisions – all major 
signals were addressed with a response almost instantaneously, e.g. the entry to the PV industry, 
acquisition of the microinverter know-how, exit before the shakeout. Moreover, as a quite 
narrowly specialized firm, it managed to successfully implement all types of strategic options, 
i.e. entry, repositioning, imitation, exit (Argyres et. al., 2015). Undoubtedly, the technological 
know-how formed the basis and the core of the business; yet, it was an outstanding sensing 
ability that enabled Solaris to navigate successfully through the dynamically changing 
competitive context of the PV industry (Gancarczyk, 2017). Hence, the strategic maneuvering 
of the firm involved dynamic switching between strategic options as the industry transformation 
progressed. 
Nevertheless, according to the gathered data, the transition process did not stop in 2017. 
Support policies have been continuously reviewed for further alternations. Hence, the overall 
picture of the PV industry may change in upcoming years, and so may the market position of 
the investigated firm, which has been recently investing in cross-industry solutions. Therefore, 
the timeframe limitation of the study can serve as a point of departure for further studies focused 
on the on-going transition processes and managerial decision making in highly uncertain 
conditions.  
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